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436 Grant Street 
Pittsburgh, PA   15219 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this case, Janine M. Orie asks us to excuse her failure 
to object to a Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation 
(“R&R”).  The R&R was ultimately adopted by the District 
Court and prompted the dismissal of her petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  Specifically, Janine1 urges us to conclude that 
the District Court should have granted her motion under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) to allow her to file 
objections to the R&R because her earlier neglect was 
excusable.  She further asks us to hold that the proper standard 
of review of the R&R is de novo because the District Court 
reviewed it de novo.  Of course, she also asserts that the R&R 
                                              
1 Since this case involves discussion of three sisters with 
the name Orie, we use their first names for ease of reference, 
intending neither disrespect nor any indication of familiarity. 
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reached the wrong conclusion.  We think otherwise and will 
affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND2 
 Janine worked as a secretary in the judicial chambers of 
her sister Joan Orie Melvin, who, during the period relevant 
here, was a judge on the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.  In 
April 2010, Janine was charged with a variety of crimes “based 
upon allegations that she conspired with another of her sisters, 
then State Senator Jane Clare Orie …, to divert the services of 
Jane[’s] … legislative staff for the benefit of [Joan’s] 2009 
political campaign for a seat as a Justice on the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania” (the “2010 charges”).  (App. at 328.)  The 
2010 charges resulted in a trial, which ended in a mistrial.   
 
 In 2011, before Janine was retried on the 2010 charges, 
prosecutors filed new charges against her (the “2011 charges”).  
The 2011 charges alleged another series of crimes, this time 
relating to activities in Joan’s judicial chambers during the 
2009 political campaign for the Supreme Court and a 2003 
campaign for that same office.   
 
 Janine later faced in a single trial both the 2010 and 
2011 charges.  She was found guilty.3  On the 2010 charges, 
                                              
2 We draw on the Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s 
description of the relevant events for background facts that are 
not in dispute. 
 
3 On the 2010 charges, Janine was convicted of theft of 
services and conspiracy to commit theft of services.  On the 
2011 charges, she was convicted of theft of services, 
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she was sentenced to “[a] determination of guilty without 
further penalty” for all counts of conviction.  (App. at 182.)  On 
the 2011 charges, she was sentenced to one year “in a county 
intermediate punishment program” for some counts and to one 
year of probation for other counts.  (App. at 181.)4 
 
 She appealed, and her convictions and sentences were 
generally affirmed.5  She then filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the District Court, arguing that her retrial on 
the 2010 charges should have been barred by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.  The case was referred to 
a Magistrate Judge, who wrote the R&R now in question, 
recommending dismissal of the petition.  The R&R concluded 
that Janine was not “in custody” for purposes of establishing 
habeas jurisdiction because she challenged only the 
                                              
misapplication of entrusted property, tampering with or 
fabricating evidence, and solicitation to tamper with or 
fabricate physical evidence.   
 
4 Janine was also ordered to pay restitution to the 
Pennsylvania Senate and to the Commonwealth on behalf of 
the Superior Court.  At sentencing, “the trial court purported to 
impose an additional condition on [Janine], namely that she 
write letters of apology[,]” including to the members of Jane’s 
legislative staff who were affected by the 2010 crimes, but that 
condition was not in the written sentencing orders.  (App. at 
331.)   
 
5 The Superior Court decided, however, that Janine did 
not have to write the apology letters because that requirement 
was not included in the written sentencing orders.   
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convictions on the 2010 charges but had received no penalty 
for them.   
 
 Although the R&R advised the parties that they had 14 
days to file any objections, no objections were filed, and the 
District Court adopted the R&R.  The Court’s order said, in 
relevant part: 
 
AND NOW, this 30th day of June, 2016, after 
the petitioner, Janine M. Orie, filed a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus, and after a Report and 
Recommendation was filed by the United States 
Magistrate Judge granting the parties a period of 
time after being served with a copy to file written 
objections thereto, and no objections having 
been filed, and upon independent review of the 
petition and the record and upon consideration of 
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation, which is adopted as the 
opinion of this Court,  
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus filed by petitioner is dismissed[.] 
(App. at 23 (citations omitted).) 
 
  About two weeks later, however, Janine filed a motion 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) on the ground that there had been a 
communications mix-up that prevented her lawyer from filing 
objections.6  The lawyer provided an explanation, saying he 
                                              
6 Rule 60(b)(1) provides that, “[o]n motion and just 
terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for … mistake, 
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had given the R&R to his legal assistant, assuming that the 
assistant would send the R&R to Janine and that Janine would 
inform him if she wanted to file objections.  The legal assistant 
did not forward the R&R, however, and the lawyer never 
followed up with Janine.  Janine learned of the District Court’s 
dismissal of her habeas petition by reading about it in the news.  
She then immediately contacted her lawyer “to ask if 
objections and a motion for reconsideration could be filed.”  
(App. at 25.)  Objections to the R&R were attached to the Rule 
60(b)(1) motion and filed with the Court.   
 
 The District Court denied the motion.  It decided that 
Janine did not meet the standard for Rule 60(b)(1) relief and 
that, in any event, her objections failed on the merits.  This 
timely appeal followed.  We granted a certificate of 
appealability as to whether the District Court erred in denying 
relief under Rule 60(b) and in dismissing the petition for lack 
of jurisdiction.  We also directed the parties to address how 
Janine’s failure to timely object to the R&R might affect our 
standard of review.   
 
II. DISCUSSION7 
 Janine makes three arguments on appeal.  First, she 
insists that she qualifies for Rule 60(b)(1) relief.  Second, she 
                                              
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect[.]”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(1). 
 
7 As explained herein, the District Court lacked habeas 
jurisdiction.  But, the Court possessed jurisdiction over the 
Rule 60(b)(1) motion because “a federal court always has 
jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction.”  Zambelli Fireworks 
7 
 
asserts that we should review the R&R de novo.  Third and 
finally, she argues that the District Court erred in dismissing 
her petition for lack of jurisdiction because she was “in 
custody.”  We disagree on each point. 
 
A. The Petitioner Is Not Entitled to Rule 60(b)(1) 
Relief 
 The first issue is whether the District Court should have 
granted Janine’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion.  Under Rule 60(b)(1), 
courts may “grant a party relief from a final judgment based 
upon, inter alia, ‘excusable neglect.’”  Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 
187, 193 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)).  
“The test for ‘excusable neglect’ is equitable, and requires us 
to weigh the ‘totality of the circumstances.’”  Id. at 193-94 
(citation omitted).  Courts are to consider the following factors: 
“1) the danger of prejudice to the other party; 2) the length of 
the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; 
3) the reason for the delay—and whether it was within the 
movant’s control; and 4) whether the movant acted in good 
faith.”  Id. at 194.  We review a Rule 60(b)(1) decision for 
abuse of discretion.  Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 
251 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
 Janine argues that there is excusable neglect here 
because her “counsel, a sole practitioner, prepared and filed the 
Motion for Reconsideration and simultaneously filed 
Objections to the R&R within 13 days of his communication 
with [her] after she read about the dismissal in the 
newspapers.”  (Opening Br. at 19.)  She says that her counsel 
                                              
Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2010).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253 and 1291. 
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filed the motion and objections within what would have been 
the allowable period for filing objections had he started 
working on them immediately after the R&R issued, and that 
he did so in order “to mitigate the late filing and notify the 
District Court that [she] had a meritorious basis for 
objecting[.]”  (Reply Br. at 2.)  Janine further asserts that “[t]he 
failure to file timely objections did not prejudice the 
Commonwealth; it had no impact on the efficient 
administration of justice; and there was no bad faith on the part 
of [herself] or counsel.”8  (Opening Br. at 18.)   
 
 Janine’s arguments fail in light of our decision in Nara 
v. Frank.  There, a magistrate judge wrote an R&R 
recommending that habeas relief be granted and warning of the 
deadline for objecting.  Nara, 488 F.3d at 193.  Neither side 
objected, so the district court adopted the R&R.  Id.  “Over two 
weeks” after the district court did so and over six weeks after 
the R&R was issued, the Commonwealth sought Rule 60(b)(1) 
relief on the ground that “it never received the R & R[.]”  Id. 
at 193-94.  We held that, despite “no evidence the 
Commonwealth acted in bad faith[,]” its “overall negligence in 
handling the matter preclude[d] us from finding ‘excusable 
neglect.’”  Id. at 194.  We noted that the Commonwealth 
attorneys were served with the R&R by first-class mail; that 
they would have received electronic notification of and access 
to the R&R if they had complied with a standing order to 
register for the court’s electronic case management system; 
                                              
8 Janine additionally suggests that she was prejudiced 
because she did not consent to the Magistrate Judge presiding 
over her case.  But the District Court here simply referred the 
case to the Magistrate Judge for an R&R.  Consent was not 
required.  Compare 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) with id. § 636(c). 
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and that “the Commonwealth failed to respond to the District 
Court’s order for 17 days[,]” without excuse, notwithstanding 
the “urgency” of its predicament.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 
The neglect manifest here is, if anything, less forgivable 
than that in Nara.9  In all, Janine’s counsel waited more than 
seven weeks to respond to the R&R.  He knew an R&R had 
been issued recommending dismissal, but he simply 
“assum[ed]” that his legal assistant would send the R&R to 
Janine “and that [Janine] would contact [him] if [she] wished 
to file objections.”  (App. at 24.)  He “never attempted to 
contact [Janine] directly” to make sure that she had no interest 
in contesting the R&R and, instead, allowed the window for 
filing objections to close.  (App. at 24.)  Furthermore, he only 
took action after Janine learned of the District Court’s 
dismissal of her case in the news.  Even then, he did not file 
anything with the Court for almost two weeks.  The unhappy 
consequence of those facts is that the “overall negligence in 
handling the matter precludes us from finding ‘excusable 
neglect.’”  Nara, 488 F.3d at 194; cf. Mullin v. Balicki, 875 
F.3d 140, 154 (3d Cir. 2017) (“It is well established that clients 
must be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their 
attorneys.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  
                                              
9 Janine suggests that, in Nara, there was prejudice to 
the petitioner and “[t]ime was of the essence[.]”  (Reply Br. at 
5.)  But while we recognized that prejudice is a factor in 
deciding a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, we did not otherwise discuss 
prejudice or apply it to the facts of that case.  Nara, 488 F.3d 
at 194.  And, although we referred to “the urgency of the 
situation,” that language related to the Commonwealth’s 
failure to respond to the decisions against it.  Id. at 193-94. 
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The District Court thus properly denied Janine’s Rule 60(b)(1) 
motion.10  
 
B. The Standard of Review Applicable to the 
R&R Is Plain Error 
 The next question is what standard of review we should 
apply in considering the merits of the R&R adopted by the 
District Court.  In general, “where a party fails to file timely 
objections to a magistrate judge’s R & R in a habeas 
proceeding, and the district court then adopts the R & R, we 
will only review the R & R for plain error.”  Nara, 488 F.3d at 
194.  There are, however, indications in our case law that we 
may review an R&R de novo where “the district court elects to 
exercise its power to review a magistrate’s report de novo[.]”  
EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis omitted); see also Evans v. Sec’y 
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 657 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Once 
the District Court independently reviewed the Magistrate 
Judge’s R & R, the Commonwealth’s ‘previous failure to 
object [became] irrelevant.’”  (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted)).  Given that Janine failed to object to the R&R and 
that Rule 60(b)(1) relief was properly denied, plain error would 
seem to be the appropriate standard.  Nevertheless, citing our 
                                              
10 The strength of a party’s position may also be relevant 
in deciding upon Rule 60(b)(1) relief.  Cf. Mullin, 875 F.3d at 
154 & n.48 (noting that, in some circumstances, a party may 
be relieved of the consequences flowing from counsel’s 
mistakes, based on a balancing of factors, including whether 
the underlying claim has merit).  As explained below, even if 
we take that into account, it does not help Janine because she 
does not have a meritorious position. 
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decision in Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1987), 
Janine argues that we should review the R&R de novo because 
the District Court reviewed it de novo before adopting it.  She’s 
mistaken both as to what the District Court did and as to the 
import of Henderson. 
 
 To begin with, the District Court’s succinct order does 
not show that it conducted a de novo review.  It is better read 
as simply noting the lack of objections and then adopting the 
R&R.  Given the absence of any independent reasoning by the 
District Court, it seems clear that, while the Court no doubt 
gave thoughtful consideration to the R&R and record, it did not 
engage in de novo review and decision making.  When it said 
that it rendered its decision “upon independent review of the 
petition and the record and upon consideration of the 
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation” (App. at 23), 
it was, we think, employing boilerplate language to assure the 
parties that it had looked at the petition and record before 
deciding to adopt the R&R; nothing more.11  Cf. City of Long 
Branch, 866 F.3d at 100 (observing that, even in the absence 
of an objection, district courts must give “reasoned 
consideration” to R&Rs (citation omitted)).  
 
 Janine’s reliance on Henderson is also misplaced.  We 
held there that “the failure of a party to object to a magistrate’s 
                                              
11 In Evans v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections, we used the phrase “independently reviewed” 
instead of “reviewed de novo.”  Evans, 645 F.3d at 657; 
Henderson, 812 F.2d at 878 n.4.  In context, we meant 
“reviewed de novo,” but we do not think that every use of the 
phrase “independently reviewed” necessarily means “reviewed 
de novo.” 
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legal conclusions may result in the loss of the right to de novo 
review in the district court—but not in the loss of the statutory 
right to appellate review.”  Id. at 878-79.  We also said, in dicta 
in a footnote, that, “when the district court elects to exercise its 
power to review a magistrate’s report de novo, a party’s 
previous failure to object becomes irrelevant” and that, “since 
the district court conducted a de novo review even though no 
objection was made, appellate review would arguably be 
proper even if we were to adopt a waiver rule.”  Id. at 878 n.4.  
We concluded that the district court had performed a de novo 
review because, “according to the district court’s order, the 
magistrate’s report was adopted only after ‘independent review 
of the entire record and applicable law.’”  Id. (citation omitted).  
But the Henderson footnote does not bind us with respect to 
what is necessary to demonstrate that a district court has 
engaged in de novo review, nor does it tell us what standard of 
review we must employ on appeal even if there has been de 
novo review in the district court.   
 
 Henderson has an entirely different focus.  It held, based 
on extensive reasoning, that appellate review is appropriate 
despite a party’s failure to object to an R&R.  Id. at 877-79.  
That is binding, and rightfully so.  The Henderson footnote 
simply added that, even if we had not reached the holding we 
did in the text of the opinion, “appellate review would arguably 
be proper” on the facts then at hand, given the district court’s 
order.  Id. at 878 n.4 (emphasis added).12  We have never 
                                              
 12 Thus, the footnote was “not necessary to our ultimate 
holding[,]” and “properly is classified as dictum.”  In re 
Friedman’s Inc., 738 F.3d 547, 552 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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adopted the Henderson footnote’s conclusion on what is 
required to show that de novo review has occurred, although 
we have cited the footnote in subsequent decisions.  For 
example, in Nara, we acknowledged the footnote in describing 
and responding to an argument that we should review an R&R 
de novo because the district court did so.  488 F.3d at 197.  We 
concluded, however, that there was “no indication the District 
Court conducted an independent review of the entire record 
and applicable law de novo.”  Id.  We did not have to decide 
what would be enough if there were some indication. 
 
 Likewise, in Evans, we cited the Henderson footnote in 
concluding that, “[o]nce the District Court independently 
reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s R & R, the Commonwealth’s 
‘previous failure to object [became] irrelevant.’”  645 F.3d at 
657 (second alteration in original) (quoting Henderson, 812 
F.2d at 878 n.4).  But, the district court in that case had 
“squarely addressed” the point at issue.  Id.  It was clear that 
there had been de novo review, so we had no occasion to assess 
whether perfunctory language in an order, like that discussed 
in the Henderson footnote, would necessarily be sufficient to 
show there had been such review. 
 
 Finally, in City of Long Branch, we cited the Henderson 
footnote for the basic proposition that a party’s failure to object 
to an R&R becomes irrelevant if the district court has reviewed 
the R&R de novo.  866 F.3d at 100.  How a party establishes 
that de novo review has occurred was not, however, at issue in 
the case.  Id. at 100-02. 
 
 In short, a party seeking to avoid the consequences of 
failing to object to an R&R by proving that the district court 
has reviewed de novo the matter at hand must point to 
14 
 
something more than boilerplate language in an order with no 
independent reasoning.  Nothing of that sort appears in the 
record here.13 
 
 Consequently, we will review the R&R for plain error.  
 
C. The R&R Was Not Plainly Erroneous in 
Concluding that the Petitioner Was Not in 
Custody 
 The final question is whether the R&R was plainly 
erroneous in concluding that Janine was not in custody – and 
therefore that habeas jurisdiction was lacking – because she 
challenged only the 2010 charges, for which she received no 
penalty.14   
 
                                              
13 Janine also emphasizes the fact that the District Court 
considered her objections to the R&R on the merits in denying 
her Rule 60(b)(1) motion.  But that is irrelevant.  We have 
already concluded that the Court’s denial of Rule 60(b)(1) 
relief was appropriate, which leaves for review only the order 
adopting the R&R.  It is the District Court’s approach in 
adopting the R&R that affects our standard of review. 
 
 14 On plain error review, Janine must show (1) there is 
an error, (2) it is plain, (3) it  affects substantial rights, and (4) 
it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
732 (1993 (citation omitted); United States v. Payano, 930 
F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[The challenger] has the burden 
of demonstrating that the four [plain error] factors are met.”). 
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 We perceive no plain error.  In our recently-issued 
decision resolving the habeas petition of Janine’s sister Jane, 
we held that Jane was not in custody on counts for which she 
received a sentence of “no further penalty” and, accordingly, 
that we could not review her challenges to those counts.  Here, 
Janine only challenges counts of conviction for which she 
received no further penalty, thus placing her case squarely in 
line with Jane’s. 
 
 Janine raises two sets of arguments in her effort to save 
jurisdiction over her petition.  First, she contends that she 
received a “general sentence” on her 2010 and 2011 charges 
because those charges, and the sentences she received on them, 
were factually and legally tied together, and, in addition, her 
2010 charges resulted in collateral consequences.  Second, she 
argues that she is really challenging her 2011 charges directly.  
According to Janine, joining her retrial on the 2010 charges 
with her trial on the 2011 charges “caused prejudice and an 
unfair trial.”  (Opening Br. at 30.)15 
 
Janine’s first set of arguments is unavailing.  Her sister 
Jane raised a similar argument that she received a “general 
sentence,” but we rejected that since her sentencing order 
imposed discrete sentences for each count of conviction and 
sentences of no further penalty on the challenged counts.  The 
                                              
 15 Janine also cites Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39 
(1995), and Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), and suggests 
that her sentences should be treated as if they were imposed 
consecutively.  Such a contention is unpersuasive because 
those cases dealt with custodial sentences imposed 
consecutively.  Here, Janine received no custodial sentence 
whatsoever on her 2010 charges.   
16 
 
same is true here.  The fact that Janine’s sentences may have 
been related and all her charges were litigated in the same 
proceedings does not establish that she was ever in custody for 
the convictions on the 2010 charges.16  See U.S. ex rel. Dessus 
v. Pennsylvania, 452 F.2d 557, 558-59 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1971) 
(concluding that a petitioner was not in custody to challenge a 
particular conviction because the sentence for that conviction 
was suspended, even though the petitioner received several 
convictions emanating from the same criminal episode and 
trial, the petitioner received lengthy sentences of imprisonment 
on many of those convictions, and the sentence on the 
challenged conviction was suspended).  Nor are collateral 
consequences enough to create custody.  See Maleng v. Cook, 
490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam) (“[O]nce the sentence 
imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral 
consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient 
to render an individual ‘in custody’ for the purposes of a habeas 
attack upon it.”). 
                                              
16 In arguing that her sentences were interrelated, Janine 
points to the fact that she was sentenced to write apology letters 
to the Pennsylvania Senate staff and to pay restitution to the 
Senate, all of whom were affected by the 2010 crimes.  She 
says that the apology letters were part of her sentence on the 
2011 charges and that the Senate restitution was part of that 
sentence.  The Superior Court, however, concluded that Janine 
was not actually sentenced to write the apology letters, so it is 
not clear how they are relevant.  Furthermore, although the trial 
court’s restitution order did not specify which set of charges 
the Senate restitution related to, nothing in the record indicates 
that it related to the 2011 charges, and a common sense reading 
of the record suggests that it related to the charges involving 
the Senate: the 2010 charges.   
17 
 
 
 As for Janine’s second line of argument, it fails because 
nothing in the record indicates that she ever argued that she 
was deprived of a fair trial on the ground that she was tried for 
the 2010 and 2011 charges together, or that she otherwise 
intended to mount a habeas challenge to her convictions on the 
2011 charges, before now.  Thus, it was hardly plain error for 
the R&R to conclude that she was only raising a challenge to 
her convictions on the 2010 charges.  And, in any event, “[w]e 
generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time on 
appeal, and will not do so in this case.”  Gardner v. 
Grandolsky, 585 F.3d 786, 793 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(citation omitted). 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s orders denying Janine Orie’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion and 
dismissing her habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction. 
